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Abstract
I use the term presumptive space to describe public space in which the state withholds full rights of
expression, but conceals this fact for political ends. Power is served by the illusion of public space. What
is presumptive will always be porous to some uncontrolled degree and may be exploited to communicate
dissent. Such reconfigurations of the visible and sayable reveal, as Jacques Rancière writes, (Rancière &
Panagia, 2000, p. 125), the buried secret of all social order: “There is no natural principle of domination by
one person over another” (Rancière, 1999, p. 79). This is the tactical importance of even the most tightly
guarded presumptive space.
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I use the term presumptive space to describe public space in which the state withholds full rights
of expression, but conceals this fact for political ends. Power is served by the illusion of public space. What
is presumptive will always be porous to some uncontrolled degree and may be exploited to communicate
dissent. Such reconfigurations of the visible and sayable reveal, as Jacques Rancière writes, (Rancière &
Panagia, 2000, p. 125), the buried secret of all social order: “There is no natural principle of domination
by one person over another” (Rancière, 1999, p. 79). This is the tactical importance of even the most
tightly guarded presumptive space.
Material public space is the place where authoritarian assurances that citizens are content may be
challenged),1 a point amply demonstrated as waves of public protest stood against official narratives
during the Arab Spring. In addition to rendering perceptible those who are affected by an issues, material
public space has the important capacity to affirm the humanity they share with their adversaries. It also
overcomes the screen of literacy that limits the Habermasian public sphere. In the dialectic between
presumptive and public space, consider Tibet, a colonial project of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
since 1950. Deprived of the instruments of democracy, indigenous Tibetans have resourcefully developed
ways to display publicly what presumptive space denies. Given the PRC’s mantra of harmony and stability,
the stakes in this encounter are high. In this essay I examine three Lhasa ethnosites that differ in the
degree to which the regime has been able to enforce its presumptive power. I also consider a recent,
radical strategy for increasing that power and a dramatic mode of Tibetan resistance.
I do not come to the space of Lhasa with a neutral mind. Han colonialism is an ongoing injustice
project for ethnic Tibetans. The story is also older than that. I begin with the creation myth of a holy city.

◊◊◊◊◊◊◊

1

Democratic regimes are not immune to efforts to suppress the unsayable in public space (Vick, 2009).

Nor is this a project of the neo-liberal state alone, which allows capital to promulgate presumptive space
through private property rights.
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The holiest icon of Tibetan Buddhism is the Jowo Rinpoche, an image of the Buddha as a young
boy. It resides in the Jokhang Temple in the heart of old Lhasa. Its story begins with Srongsten Gampo (r.
627–649), who conquered the indigenous Bons living on the Tibetan plateau, imposed Buddhist
hegemony, and expanded his empire to Central Asia. When his bride-to-be Princess Wencheng arrived in
Lhasa bearing the Jowo as a wedding gift, her wagon became mired in the mud. Understanding this as a
divine omen, Srongsten Gampo set about constructing a temple. However, each day’s building was
mysteriously undone. Divination revealed an ancient Bon-po demoness sleeping in the earth, stretched
large and terrible across the whole of Tibet—a powerful threat to the new court religion of Buddhism.
Srongsten Gampo commanded the building of 10 more temple enclaves to “pin down” the demoness’s
elbows, knees, wrists, ankles, and shoulders (Mills, 2007) and render her immobile. The Jowo-containing
Jokhang lies over her heart, anchoring the sacred and ancient geography that marked Tibet up to the
middle of the last century.
This mythopoetic legitimation of Buddhist domination of seventh-century Tibet conveys the
charged connection between landscape and political power, and the reinvention of geography that
accompanies political suppression. The tale of the demoness is a story of old powers enclosed—a central
term for this analysis—in an architecture meant to absorb and defeat them. In 1950, a new wave of
occupiers from the PRC arrived in Lhasa brandishing fresh civilizing gestures and incorporative landscape
strategies. In 1965, the PRC enclosed a portion of the plateau as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),
dividing ethnic homelands and severing ancient trading ties.2
Though it is larger than Western Europe, the TAR has a smaller population and smaller share of
GDP than any Chinese province (Wong, 2008, p. A6). Some of the world's poorest people live on its high
terrain. As a land buffer to nuclear India and a source of significant mineral reserves and water (ten major
Asian river systems originate here), it is indispensable to China’s drive to become the world’s greatest
economy, an effort sporadically impeded by the TAR’s restive indigenous population. Like a fitfully sleeping
demoness, the Tibetan longing for autonomy and religious freedom periodically erupts in uprisings that
mobilize Western sympathies, inducing political anxiety in the PRC (Roberts & Roberts, 2009).
Tibetans have no enforceable rights of dissent. Any atmosphere of toleration disappeared in the
Tibetan riots of 2008. These were a particular affront to the regime in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics,
when China’s human rights record was a focus of international concern (Goldstein, Sherap, & Sibenschuh,
2004, pp. 156, 164–167). The wave of unrest that unraveled across the plateau has never fully subsided.
It continues in a spectacular, distressing mode of public disruption that is uniquely suited to rip the mask
off presumptive public space. That mode is self-immolation to protest the regime. Since February 2009,
118 Tibetan monks, nuns and laypersons have set themselves afire (Wong, 2013).
In 1950, Lhasa’s area was less than three square kilometers. The Han have since established
their own facts on the ground. Sixty years of building, demolition, and immigration have transformed an
ancient holy city into a shrinking ethnic quarter surrounded by high-rises and Han storefronts spilling
2

I use Tibetan and Tibet to denote the indigenous inhabitants of a historical nation. Han designates the

ethnic majority of the PRC.
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westward into the Kyichu Valley. Most resident Tibetans live in the crumbling residue of this original stone,
mud, and timber fabric, now less than 2% of the city and shrinking. Han dominion is visible in the city’s
population mix, in the dominance of Mandarin street and shop signs, and in English- and Mandarinlanguage maps of tourist sites and Chinese buildings that omit Tibetan commercial establishments. Until
lately the most drastic change in the fabric of Lhasa was west of its Tibetan core: an expanding settlement
of office buildings and high-rises where Tibetans largely work as menials. In May 2013, Tsering Woeser, a
well-known Tibetan poet and blogger based in Beijing, posted on her blog an account of demolition in the
heart of Lhasa to make way for a tourist city that will reconstruct the ancient Barkhor, the holiest pilgrim
path in Lhasa (Woeser, 2013).
Tibetan development since Jiang Zemin has been partly a strategy to thwart Tibetan separatism
by tethering Tibet to the mainland economically (International Commission of Jurists, 1997, p. 144). More
than two million farmers and nomads whose modest plateau economies have been devastated by internal
resource extraction and agricultural modernization have been forcibly relocated to pre-fabricated,
permanent roadside settlements (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 4). A long-term policy of population
transfer has also flooded the capital with Han workers lured by state incentives or displaced by agricultural
modernization, dam projects, and natural disasters (International Campaign for Tibet, 2003, p. 31). Most
stay three to five years and repatriate their earnings. While official population counts cannot be verified,
the 2010 census claimed that Tibetans were 90.5% of the TAR’s permanent population excluding
temporary workers, their dependents, and military troops (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2013, April 19, p. 9). In 2011, a Lhasa city official estimated that
260,000 of 450,000 individuals living in downtown Lhasa belonged to the “floating population” (U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2013, April 19, p. 9). This accords
with other observational estimates that Hans make up one-half to two-thirds of all Lhasa residents (e.g.,
Roberts & Roberts, 2009, p. 20).
Internal migration by Tibetan indigenes to Lhasa is tightly restricted, and unemployment in the
city is high among Tibetans, Most are employed in low-status jobs and are less able than Han migrants to
find work on construction projects run by bosses partial to Mandarin speakers trained in Chinese building
techniques. The state also bars religious practitioners from access to higher education, available only on
the mainland, and government jobs (Adams, 1996; Schwartz, 1994, p. 206).
A symbol is a strategy for encompassing a situation, says Kenneth Burke (1973). This surely
includes architecture. “Encompassing a situation” well describes enclosure, a strategy for creating
presumptive public space. In this case, I take enclosure to mean a wrapping of material space that makes
ideologically energized use of walls, barriers, and surveillance to harness and strangle Tibetan spaces from
without. It encroaches, viselike, on a weak center.3 Architectural “solidification” constructs an official
impermeability to Tibetan cultural, spiritual, and political aspirations (Jones, 2000, pp. xxviii, 41).
On guard against punctures that could weaken and deflate them, Han enclosures aim to
homogenize and fuse with Tibetan space, concealing the past to deflect detection and critique. By
3

Foucault (1977/1979) was here first, defining carceral enclosure as a “protected place of disciplinary

monotony” (p. 141).
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targeting the material taproot of Tibetan culture, enclosure renders even ethnosites that survived the
Cultural Revolution spiritually lifeless and civically impotent (Appadurai, 1990; Jones, 2000, pp. xxviii, 41)
These absorptive schemes compress any surviving complexity or coherence into a decorative veneer
suited to tourist brochures, television specials (e.g., CCTV.com, 2011), and other mediated versions of
presumptive public space. Stephen Flusty’s analysis (1994, pp. 16–17) of paranoid urban spaces perfectly
describes enclosure tactics. Camouflage and concealment create stealthy spaces that are difficult to
locate. Slippery spaces lack paths of direct approach, crusty spaces pose physical barriers to access,
prickly spaces are uncomfortable to occupy, and jittery spaces cannot be utilized unobserved. I propose
yet another tactic: one space ingests another to cannibalize its identity. This is what is occurring in the
Barkhor.
These mechanisms are up against porosity, exploitable gaps that limit how walled-off
presumptive space can be. Threading a resistant cosmological meaning through permeable pockets of
presumptive public space, Tibetans create alternative spatialities in rituals of constancy and community
that reanimate sacred space within a political order unable to fully enclose it. Resilient porosity poses a
public space dilemma for the PRC, which relies on displays of Tibetan sanctity to scoop up tourist dollars.
Encounters between enclosers and enclosed in Lhasa reflect particular circumstances. More
generally, they show how certain modes of publicness advance by weakening and destroying others, and
how the local remains a fragile production, indeterminate and unruly (Appadurai, 1990, p. 186).4
From the least to the most successfully enclosed, I will consider three Lhasa ethnosites:
1) The holiest: The Barkhor pilgrimage path around the Jokhang Temple is the spiritual and social
hub of a Tibetan quarter ringed with surveillance and relentlessly squeezed by an encircling Hanbuilt city. Owing to the persistence of Tibetans themselves, this was long the most resolutely
public space in Lhasa. Now a series of government-business ventures with shopping malls,
underground parking, gaudy decorations, signage, and relocated residents threatens to obliterate
the lived history that made the corridor powerful for Tibetans.
2) The most visible: The Potala Palace, the highest in the world, is the emblem of Tibet itself. For
centuries it was the residence of the Dalai Lama. Its last inhabitant, the Fourteenth, fled to
Dharamshala in 1959, leaving the palace ripe for enclosure as a trophy of Chinese Democratic
Reform.5 A Chinese-built plaza annexed at its base unrolls an immense plain that both rivals the
majestic structure and partners with it, making the whole a fused icon of Han sovereignty.
4

The always already there Lefebvrian notion of lived space as co-created common life (1991, p. 38) can

be seen as a historically precipitated enclosure, a grooved and worn alluvium of conceived space made
habitable over time by traditions of narrative and practice. The legend of the demoness has smoothed the
sharp edges of a Buddhist hegemony into a nourishing myth. This process of historical gentling does not
yet extend to contemporary Tibetans conscious of being overrun by the PRC as Tibetans once overran the
Bon.
5

After 1959, the official label for the PLA pacification of Tibet by the Peoples’ Liberation Army.
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Until recently the Lhasa railway station was the largest Chinese-built edifice in

Tibet, the terminus of the Tibet-Qinghai railway, and a world-class public works project. Attentive
to its local rival, the Potala, the station displaces Lhasa as the center of a landscape that
dominated a demoness. Traversing miles of high-altitude permafrost, its tundra-spanning highspeed train mobilely encloses the plateau experience for travelers and tourists.
The Jokhang and Kora: The Lure of the Local

Figure 1. Devotees prostrating themselves at the entrance to the Jokhang Temple.
Source: http://www.shafir.info/plain/tibet~lhasa~jokhang_temple~jokhang_temple_2.htm

Traditional Lhasa is laid out as a blueprint of Mt. Meru, the cosmological mountain of Tibetan
Buddhism, materialized as three concentric pilgrimage paths centered on the Jowo Rinpoche. Every
Tibetan Buddhist is charged to pilgrimage to the Jowo during his or her lifetime (Figure 1). On these paths
devotees perform kora, the ritual circumambulation that grounds a Tibetan spatial imaginary within Hancontrolled public space. Kora daily renews the city as a cosmogonic mandala.6 The outermost path, the

6

Devotees gain sacred merit by circumambulating stupas, temples, lakes, piles of mani stones, and other

artifacts vibrating with spiritual energy (chinlab). With each meritorious peregrination, devotees move
closer to a good rebirth.
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Lingkor, now intercut with new construction and highways, follows the traditional boundaries of the city.
Prostrators performing chaktal at morning rush hour skirt built obstacles and ford intersections, pausing at
small shrines with offerings and mani stones.7 Normally the preserve of the elderly with time on their
hands for devotion and exercise, on holidays the Lingkor boasts processions of young people striding
briskly along.
The innermost Nangkor traces the inside perimeter of the dukhan, the god-lined, banner-hung
assembly hall of the Jokhang. The air is thick with smoke, chanting, and the smell of rancid yak butter
offerings poured from thermoses to fuel temple lamps. In this dark, close space of fresco-painted icons
and holy scenes, white silk prayer scarves, barley beer, fruit, small gifts, and paper currency drape each
shrine and reliquary, peek from every opening, adorn every surface. Monks and lamas bless the heads of
the faithful and clasp their hands.
It is the middle path, the Barkhor, where spiritual life is most publicly on display and most
threatening to the Chinese (Figure 2). Here are my field notes about the Barkhor in 2007, before the
recent construction:
At sunrise, growing streams of circumambulators spill from small streets and alleys
feeding into the corridor from the Tibetan quarter. Passing market stalls not yet open,
devotees roll rosary beads and spin prayer wheels near the outer wall of the Jokhang.
Many toss roasted barley and juniper into incense burners to beseech the gods. Groups
of devotees arrange themselves in rows at the temple entrance. Folding their bodies
sharply in half, they slap the ground and execute full-body prostrations. Wooden blocks
attached to their hands slide sibilantly across the flagstones. Some will occupy the same
spot all day.
Soon the Barkhor will be crowded with briskly moving monks, visiting pilgrims, and
locals sociably chanting and murmuring. Wide-eyed tourists walk with the crowds. A few
pilgrims lead animals—dogs and sheep that, once blessed, may not be butchered for
food. Many walkers wear sheepskin chubas for warmth and wide-brimmed felt hats
against the sun. Married women in striped aprons mingle with tall, nomadic Khampamen
in high-heeled boots with weather-burned faces and gold teeth, hair braided in red yarn

7

Prostration is a strenuous devotional practice of advancing along a chosen religious path. Standing

prostrators clasp their hands above their heads, pulling them straight down to forehead and heart in turn.
In a single swift motion they bend down to slap their hands on the ground for support, thrusting their legs
out to their full length behind. The movement ends by stretching the fingers, as they rest on the ground,
to the sky. Pulling their legs to a sitting position at a point no further than the place their outstretched
hands have come to rest, they begin the sequence again. Canvas aprons and leather kneepads are often
worn to protect the body, and wooden blocks are sometimes strapped to the palms.
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and wrapped around their heads.8 Coral and turquoise jewelry are on display, and silver
daggers tucked in waist wraps and belts. Silver bracelets with coral, turquoise, and bone
adorn Khampa women. (Marvin, 2007)
The passing parade is skewed middle-aged and older, part generational attentiveness to
devotional obligation, part political necessity. To protect jobs and university places, students and Tibetan
cadres may disguise circumambulation as ordinary walking (Keutsang, 2001, p. 187).
Lacking formal political power, Tibetans embrace kora as a mode of public expression. They use
the only instruments they have, their ritual resourcefulness and their bodies, to draw a landscape of
cosmic concern into palpable existence and signify to others that they do so. The alternative spiritual
order they inhabit unsettles the Han.9 These constant, simple journeys tirelessly construct the graduated
stupa of the universe and convene a deep, horizontal comradeship (borrowing from Benedict Anderson) of
the faithful from every part of the plateau, every age, class, and monastic lineage. This commitment to
the institutions and relationships that sustain the sacred universe is visible to all. The Jokhang provides a
resonant accompanying narrative by symbolizing the defeat of underworld forces, “turning them from evil
to good,” uniting a victorious Buddhist nation “under the governance of a righteous king” (Schwartz, 1994,
p. 34).
Given this potent public witness, it is unsurprising that over the years, the most explosive
confrontations between Tibetans and the authorities have begun in the Barkhor (Figure 3). Seeing kora in
action is a touristic mandate for Western and Chinese visitors, whose dollars help offset the more than $5
billion invested in Han development since liberation.
In 1984, an access road was widened into a broad plaza in front of the temple with parking for
tour buses. The plaza made a show of religious tolerance while providing open ground for troops to swoop
in at any sign of disorder. A police station nearly opposite the entrance to the Jokhang signals the jittery
(Flusty’s term for constantly observing) readiness of authorities to clamp down on dissent. Especially
notable amidst the eddying crowds is what does not move: an elaborate security apparatus of
loudspeakers, cameras, and officers of the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Streams of circumambulators part
around these human islands of enclosure seated on four sides of the temple beneath parasols that block

8

After 2008 the Chinese increasingly restricted Tibetan travel within and outside the TAR, thereby
disrupting Tibetan pilgrimages to sacred religious sites (U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor (2013, May 20, p. 8)
9
Despite their reputation for nonviolence, Tibetans have forcibly resisted the Chinese. They seized the
Chinese capital of X’ian and established a puppet government in the eighth century. They successfully
expelled Qing dynasty troops from Lhasa in 1912. They put up armed resistance during the 1959 uprising
against Chinese rule, the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965, a Cultural Revolution
massacre on June 7, 1968, and riots in 1987 and 1989. The 2008 riots are the latest in this narrative.
Today factions of the exile community oppose the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way of nonviolence and cultivation
of the Chinese.
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the harsh plateau sun, poised to shut down any unfurled Tibetan flag, any flash of a protest sign or picture
of the Dalai Lama, or self-immolation attempt.10
The Barkhor has been a relatively unsuccessful presumptive space. In the porous center of the
old city, closing down the corridor in response to protest is politically clumsy. Confrontations between
Tibetans and police are quickly reported in social media, so that even the most ideologically innocent are
informed of the structure of force that coerces Tibetan protests and religious activity. This makes China
vulnerable to international criticism. More important, it endangers the touristic romance that translates
into revenues.

Figure 2. The Jokhang Temple and Barkhor Corridor, Lhasa.

10

Stationing police around the temple goes back to 1987. Ronald Schwartz (1994) chronicled the 1987

uprising that launched the modern fusion of religion and political protest in Tibet and its aftermath.
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Figure 3. Disorder in the Barkhor, March 24, 2008.
Source: Anonymous tourist photo. The New York Times at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/world/asia/24tibet.html?fta=y

Ethnic resistance last exploded in 2008. The anniversary of the March 10, 1959, national uprising
converged with the Tibetan New Year, a frequent occasion of unrest. A group of monks marched on the
Barkhor to protest the detention of colleagues from Drepung Monastery.11 The PAP truncheoned them.
Four days later, Tibetans responded by looting and burning Han shops and dwellings and setting fire to
vehicles. Over two days, 19 ethnic Han were beaten and killed. According to Xinhua, 382 civilians and 241
police were injured (“Beijing’s Blind Spot,” p. A38). Dharamshala, the Tibetan government in exile, placed
Tibetan deaths at 203, and thousands were detained (Barboza, 2008, p. A14; Wong, 2008, p. A6). The
turmoil traveled quickly across the plateau.
Having learned in Tiananmen Square that local space has a different scale in a viral age, and
mindful of international scrutiny just before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, authorities moved slowly. By some
accounts their delayed response was calculated to embolden Tibetan rioters and furnish footage of
Chinese restraint for international circulation. Tourists’ and journalists’ travel permits were revoked. The
Barkhor circuit was closed. In the words of James Miles, the sole Western journalist in Lhasa at the time:

11

For a detailed account of the riots see Barnett (2008).
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The road around the [Jokhang] temple, normally packed with pilgrims spinning their
prayer wheels and murmuring prayers, is now nearly empty. At one point those trying to
walk around it—an act of piety—were required to walk through a column of gun and
baton-toting troops, one by one, and present their identity cards. Your correspondent
saw several turned away—usually it appeared, pilgrims from out of town—before the
circuit was blocked to all. The pious had no choice but to turn back, retracing their steps
around the temple in an anti-clockwise direction (to Tibetans unholy). (Quoted in “Lhasa
under Siege,” 2008).
Six weeks later, Tibet was reopened to closely supervised groups of Han sightseers and
journalists. During the jittery interval surrounding the Olympics, authorities tried to prevent additional
dissent without further tarnishing the image of Chinese harmony or drying up tourist dollars. Restrictions
on travel and the skittishness of prospective visitors shrank tourist arrivals from 4 million in 2007, the first
full year of the Qinghai-Tibet railway operation, to 2.2 million in 2008 (“China Aiming,” 2009).
On the same anniversary a year later, the Chinese, hoping to dampen unrest, launched a
preemptive tactical enclosure by offering cash for New Year celebrations to monasteries across the TAR. It
was mostly refused. March 28, 2009, was designated “Serf Liberation Day.” Under military lockdown and
in the absence of foreign tourists, displays of mass compliance commemorated the official emancipation of
Tibet (Dasgupta, 2009; Shakya, 2009). Troops patrolled monasteries. Cell phones were jammed. The
State Council Information Office released a white paper lauding half a century of Democratic Reform, as
the Han takeover is called, and the liberation of a million people from an oppression “darker than medieval
Europe.”
Despite the political risk, local surreptitiously court Westerners for their ability to focus world
attention on the plight of Tibetans (Schwartz, 1994). Meanwhile, the spiritual and material desires of wellintentioned Western and Chinese visitors pose their own kind of peril. “Tibet is once again being
Orientalised, this time not by Western orientalists but by the urban elite of new China,” one observer
wrote (Shepherd, 2006, p. 254). Locals have been accused of performing scripted simulations of the
“authentic Tibetanness” visitors demand (Adams, 1996, p. 511). No doubt such performances exist, but
the ranks of dedicated circumambulators gave no impression of play-acting during my visit in the summer
before the 2008 riots. Outside the scrutiny of resident Hans, ordinary Tibetans took pains to signal
displeasure with the Chinese at every opportunity in buses, restaurants, and tea shops. I heard similar
reports from other Western visitors.
Simulation will now emerge on a different scale in staged backgrounds for restaurants, bars, and
art galleries aiming to draw new kinds of tourists to the renamed Lhasa City. Having survived the removal
of mani cylinders and Buddha statues, prohibitions on religious practice, the desecration and looting of the
Jokhang during the Cultural Revolution, and demolitions of stately mansions at the margin of the corridor,
the Tibetan quarter now faces a new challenge. At stake is the rapid ingestion of the dense fabric of the
quarter by malls and open squares, plans to stealthily relocate most residents of the old city (making
them hard to find) to a slippery western suburb (with no contiguous connection), the crusty denial (posing
a barrier) of entry permits for Kham and Ando pilgrims from outside the TAR, and the pull of a popular
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culture that inundates the young with images of a dazzling world beyond the quarter. The goal is to
weaken the spiritual power of the Barkhor by demolishing a seeable history of patient suffering and
endurance within which kora makes sense, and in which the Chinese must be careful in showing their
hand.
To sum up: The daily undertow of kora has long reproached Han efforts to fashion a presumptive
landscape of unity. In Flusty’s terms, the Barkhor Corridor has been a jittery space manifestly under
surveillance. Exchanges of covert messages among the streaming pilgrims make it a prickly space for both
devotees and police. Porosity, its greatest protection, managed to put authorities visibly on the defensive.
Plainly visible coercive techniques shored up a Han version of public order even as the infiltration of
monasteries and detention of dissidents was concealed. Limited enclosure enjoyed limited success. The
Chinese once accepted the costs of public visibility to convince Tibetans of the futility of dissent in a
presumptive space of controlled expression, but that tolerance appears to be over. They are remaking the
space with the sole object of generating tourist revenue and eradicating a holy tradition’s visible
sedimentation on any terms other than theirs. Architecture will no longer take exception to power.
Security will be more present and less obvious. Only the Jokhang itself is likely to survive, stranded in a
built environment that insures the presumptive separation of protest from the temple itself.

Figure 4. The Potala Palace and the Square.
Source: http://www.presscluboftibet.org/china-tibet-29/potala-palace.htm
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From a Han perspective, the second ethnosite has been a more successful enclosure. The Potala
Palace, a 13-story fortress-monastery at the summit of Marpo Ri, consists of 1,000 rooms (Amundsen,
2001). Rising as if sculpted from the cliffs, its chunked trapezoidal masses echo the spectacular peaks
around them (Figure 4). The palace’s mystical associations draw the devout and spiritually adventurous—
or rather, they used to. Climbing the Potala’s seemingly endless steps once meant ascending Mt. Meru
toward enlightenment. These days Mt. Meru is full of tourists wearing costumes and taking photographs.
Many arrive in Chinese-approved tour groups, social enclosures that manage how tourists spend their
time. Tibet’s largest industry is tourism, and the Potala is its largest draw. At night it glows with the
jarring luminosity of a Las Vegas casino.
Built over a thousand years from the 7th to the 17th centuries, the palace is the mythical abode
of Avalokiteśvara-Chenrezig, the Bodhisattva of Compassion, reincarnated in successive Dalai Lamas who
presided over predecessors entombed within, each a link in a continuously emanated chain of the living
and the dead. A Tibetan song that sees the Dalai Lama’s face in the sun’s reflection off its golden roof, and
his robes in the khatags at its base (Woeser, 2007), testifies to the identification of His Holiness with the
palace in the imagination of the faithful. These days the palace is a trophy of Democratic Reform, seized
when the Dalai Lama fled to India, leaving his predecessors in the custody of the PRC.
A time-consuming process of securing tickets to the palace gives authorities the opportunity to
screen and limit tourists on a given day. For strictly limited periods, visitors are shepherded past
surveillance cameras and state-licensed guides on tightly controlled tours through the museum portion of
the palace. Ethnic Tibetans, their numbers adjusted to accommodate daily tourist allocations, visit through
a separate entrance. Some perform small rituals when the guards are not looking.
In 1995, the Chinese razed the Shöl, an ancient settlement at the base of Marpo Ri. In its place a
vast military parade ground, un-Tibetan in scale and horizontality, stamps the Chinese brand on the
noblest structure in Tibet. The plaza references Tiananmen Square, the premier public space of the PRC.
New Potala Palace Square’s egalitarian expanse pokes a revolutionary thumb in the eye of the aloof,
mysterious Potala, the architectural jewel of feudal Tibet. Just as Tiananmen’s annexation to the Forbidden
City usurped and assimilated imperial mystique for revolutionary China (Hung, 2005), New Potala Palace
Square appropriates the palace’s majesty and prestige for state occasions and military parades. On the far
side of the plaza, the sculpture “Memorial to the Liberation of Tibet” represents Mt. Everest and China’s
claim to the world’s highest mountain (Figure 5). The point for a local population is that Everest is higher
than the peak on which the highest palace in the world rises. Tibetans have their own narrative for the
plaza. They call it Kalachakra Square, imagining the Dalai Lama’s future return to conduct a worldcreating Kalachakra initiation for 100,000 devotees on this very site (Barnett, 2006, pp. 82, 186).
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Figure 5. Memorial to the Liberation of Tibet, New Potala Palace Square.
Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/asipos49/4813036540/sizes/o/in/photostream

The square was a fraught setting in the prelude to the Olympics. The Olympic torch’s global
journey commenced shortly after the Lhasa riots, and “Free Tibet” demonstrations followed it around the
world to reach Lhasa in June. It traversed five miles of heavily policed streets filled with spectators
sporting identical nametags and waving identical Chinese flags. Avoiding the Tibetan quarter and the site
of the riots, the torch advanced to New Potala Palace Square, where the Chinese Communist Party’s
Tibetan secretary denounced the “splittist” schemes of the “Dalai clique” (Reynolds, 2008). “Tibet’s sky will
never change and the red flag with five stars will forever flutter high above it,” he declared (Yardley,
2008, para. 2). Rhetorically, he elevated the Chinese standard above the palace, a pointed image in a
Buddhist nation where fluttering prayer flags transport believers’ wishes to heaven.
The square is the site of real-estate promotions, car exhibitions, commercial fairs, fashion shows,
and military parades (Figure 6). The Tibetan-Chinese pop singer Han Hong performed there in 2004 after
a furious blogging campaign denounced her plans to land on the palace in a helicopter as a desecration.
Instead she landed on the square. The image of the palace is a commercial staple, appearing on mobile
phone advertisements, 50 RMB currency notes, MTV, and clothing. The blogger Woeser (2007, para. 15)
laments, “The Potala Palace has even been miniaturized into models made from very cheap materials for
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use as window displays in hotels, restaurants and shops, decorating the vulgar landscape of this
commodity-driven society controlled by ideology. Through such a process of being endlessly reproduced,
[the palace] has been thrown down into the world of mortals from the heights of heaven.”

Figure 6. Youth Day in Potala Square, May 4, 2009.
Source: http:www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?156617Today-s-Photos-Tuesday-May-5th-2009Reuters

As an enclosure, the Potala is stealthy, its interior concealed from outside view; slippery, as
bureaucratic obstacles block direct access; crusty (physically barricaded); and jittery (constantly
observed). Whereas the Barkhor’s circling parade publicly rebukes Han control, the Potala museum ingests
Tibetan history in a triumphalist narrative that lacks any punctuating debate. Still, it is gloriously porous.
Towering unenclosable above the city, it poses and reposes the question of the Dalai Lama’s absence to all
who see it. The Chinese regard it as a monument to their victory over feudalism. For Tibetans it signifies
the constancy of the Dalai Lama, whose return they long for. Because the sight of the Potala is
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unenclosable, so is its final meaning. The Chinese are doing what they can do about this, constructing a
skyline of tall buildings that reduce the Potala’s domination of the horizon from the vantage of the streets.
Train to Heaven
The high-speed Qinghai-Tibet railway, completed in 2006, brings new enclosures to Tibet. First is
the railway station, until recently the city’s largest Chinese-built edifice (Figure 7). The station reprises the
Potala in modernist terms, duplicating the palace’s white and ochre palette, mimicking its massed volumes
and trapezoidal shapes, and, like the palace, exaggerating the traditional scale and proportions of Tibetan
architecture. There are differences as well. The station’s concrete walls straighten the tapered grace of the
Potala’s silhouette and regularize its irregular masses in the manner of such monuments to Soviet
classicism as the Ten Great Buildings in Tiananmen Square. Whereas the original Potala embeds itself in
the landscape, the reprised version is a “drama of intimidation” (Carrasco, 1981) standing solitary on its
concrete plain.
Before 1959 the inner Red Palace of the Potala contained a monastery and ritual precincts. The
outer White Palace housed administrative offices. The reinvented Potala inverts that palette, perhaps
deliberately. The more secular white has migrated to the station’s central elevation and is flanked by
ochre wings. At opening ceremonies in 2006, Han broadcasters described this traditional Tibetan hue as
the “red of Chinese happiness.”
The station is a supremely confident landmark of Chinese nationalism with, it could be said,
Tibetan characteristics. Fused Han and Tibetan elements testify to political and cultural integration.
Alternatively, one could say that Tibetan traditions are imprisoned in Chinese stone. Ingesting the palace
and reanimating it in sinicized form, the station is the 21st-century version of nailing down the demoness.
The symbolic compression of enclosure appropriates the palace’s emanated majesty to serve Chinese
triumphalism. The semiotics of domination sucks the life but not the politics from Tibetan space.12

12

I adapt Vincent Miller’s figure of speech (2006).
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Figure 7. Lhasa Railway Station.
Source:
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.rmtbristolrail.org.uk/archives/Lhasa2.jpg&imgrefurl=
http://www.rmtbristol.org.uk/2006/06/&usg=__5tlrvTbLqmklsmCIgHl59k9J0WU=&h=305&w=450&sz=46
&hl=en&start=44&zoom=1&tbnid=Yj_jdUgd7xUnQM:&tbnh=155&tbnw=238&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dlhas
a%2Btrain%2Bstation%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DN%26biw%3D1160%26bih%3D839%26tbs
%3Disch:10%2C1444&um=1&itbs=1&iact=hc&vpx=149&vpy=297&dur=1747&hovh=185&hovw=273&tx
=165&ty=115&ei=ZFK_TKaVNYH78Abk_siBg&oei=8VG_TKXYLYi6jAeGjtm6Ag&esq=8&page=3&ndsp=18&ved=1t:429,r:4,s:44&biw=1160&bih=839
For centuries, every traveler’s first glimpse of Lhasa was the shining grandeur of the Potala
growing larger and more splendid on approach (e.g., Seth, 1987, pp. 117–118). An exquisitely
competitive architecture of address now redirects that moment to the concrete and brick doppelganger of
the station, where travelers disembark. As the train approaches Lhasa, the original palace may be
glimpsed, remote and fleeting, paling before the monumental immediacy of the station. More than an
ancient travelers’ beacon has been displaced. The station has created a new urban periphery linked to the
city not by pilgrims’ paths but a multilane highway for automobiles, the Chinese status symbol of choice.
Tibetans cannot walk or prostrate along it. It is unsuited to the modest vehicles of most Tibetans—rusty,
wheezing, oft-repaired cars and trucks of ancient vintage, human-powered tuk-tuks and bicycles, and
animal-powered carts. The station explodes the Lhasa Dharmachakra, the divine blueprint that grounds
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the city. Once a symbol of the center of a universe, the Potala has become a frontier outpost in the thrall
of Beijing. Taunted by the station, annexed to New Potala Palace Square, it is a conscripted collaborator
with the regime, a monument to what the Chinese regard as a dead past yoked to a Han portal to the
future. Emptied of its aura of divine singularity, it stands as the more remote of a matched pair of temples
to the rites of tourism.
The production of “solidification” continues within. A bronze, wall-sized topographic map of the
TAR naturalizes the military-bureaucratic conquest of modern Tibet (Figure 8). A larger tapestry of the
Potala hangs in an immense VIP waiting room nearby. (An even larger Chinese carpet covers the floor.)
The eight auspicious Tibetan symbols carved in relief on the ochre walls of the waiting rooms have been
sinicized in submission to the dominant culture.

Figure 8. Topographic map inside the Lhasa railway station.
Source:
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.traveladventures.org/continents/asia/images/trainto-lhasa07.jpg&imgrefurl=http://pictures.traveladventures.org/images/train-to-lhasa07&usg=__fsoUdYk7Wn3oaHmRApyDF6Jsh4=&h=350&w=525&sz=72&hl=en&start=0&zoom=1&tbnid=7A8GtsN8kBW40
M:&tbnh=130&tbnw=173&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dlhasa%2Btrain%2Bstation%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den
%26sa%3DN%26biw%3D1160%26bih%3D839%26tbs%3Disch:1&um=1&itbs=1&iact=hc&vpx=118&vpy
=221&dur=1435&hovh=183&hovw=275&tx=147&ty=102&ei=8VG_TKXYLYi6jAeGjtm6Ag&oei=8VG_TKXY
LYi6jAeGjtm6Ag&esq=1&page=1&ndsp=26&ved=1t:429,r:5,s:0
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The Tibet-Qinghai rail link spans 1,142 kilometers (about 710 miles) from Gormo in Qinghai
province to Lhasa. This, the highest railbed in the world, traverses permafrost for more than half its length
to summit Tanggula Pass at 5,072 meters (16,640 feet). Building it took five years, 100,000 workers, and
$4.1 billion. Eight daily trains run in each direction. Students, migrants, and families of modest means buy
a hard seat from Beijing to Lhasa for about $50. Higher up the scale, tourists and businessmen spend
$174 on a soft sleeper in a four-berth compartment (“Train Travel in Lhasa,” 2011). During its first six
months of operation, tourist visits jumped 86.3% compared to the same period in the previous year
(“Callers Decry,” 2007). In its first year, 1.4 million travelers arrived by air, and 1.5 million took the train
(“Potala, Norbu Lingka Palaces,” 2008).
Months before the opening of the rail link, state media broadcast a haunting ballad depicting the
train as a Chinese gift to grateful Tibetans: “Heavenly Road,” sung by the Tibetan-born pop star Han
Hong. The video version, which migrated to YouTube in 2007 (Han, n.d.), punctuates stunning plateau
scenery with cheerful close-ups of herders on pilgrimage, at home with animals and tents, performing
traditional dances and rituals, and proffering warm hospitality to Han Hong and smiling workers laying
train tracks. Tibetans in traditional dress run after construction machinery and adorn it with blessing
scarves.
Han Hong secured the song rights from another Tibetan artist, Basang, for the CCTV3 Spring
Festival Gala, a huge entertainment platform with strong government support. Basang’s video, posted
with English subtitles to YouTube in 2008, is more suited to prospective tourists (Basang 2008). The
landscape it features looks like what travelers glimpse from the train. Traditional herders have all
vanished. Singing on an empty, beautiful plateau, Basang wears an ornate folkloric costume associated
with touristic performance. The only human company she meets is aboard the sealed train, where smiling
Tibetans in contemporary clothes gather round her. A Chinese conductor serves tea. In Basang’s video,
religious tolerance is on display. She stands before a Tibetan temple with a holy man and makes a butter
offering. His robes identify him as a practitioner of the Nyingma school, the oldest Tibetan Buddhist
lineage, which has a tradition of refusing political power (Ortner, 1978).
The translation text accompanying “Heavenly Road” figures the plateau as a dream-like vista
beheld from afar and not a landscape of distinct places:
At dawn I stand on the green grassland
I see a magical eagle bathed in ruddy light
Like an auspicious cloud soaring through the sky
Bringing good luck to the Tibetan people.
At dusk I stand atop the tall mountain peak
I see the railway built to my hometown
A colossal dragon soaring through the mountains
Bringing prosperity to the snowy plateau
That is a magical Heaven Road.
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Bringing us to paradise on earth
Barley beer and butter tea will taste more sweet
Joyful songs echo in all directions.
What do passengers on the Road to Heaven actually see? Here is one account (Qiu, 2007):
Traveling at about 100 kilometres an hour . . . I have the opportunity to review the
scenery—the magnificent Mount Yuzhu reaching up to 6,178 metres, the turquoise
Namuco Lake shimmering under the unearthly Tibetan light, nomads dressed in colorful
robes, turrets with red, blue and green prayer flags fluttering near a Communist flag.
Fourteen hours later, at the end of an uneventful journey, the train pulls into the great
vault of Lhasa’s new railway station. (p. 402)
Uneventful indeed. An extreme terrain is tamed by preventing all encounters with it. 13 On-board
narratives fashion a remote, hazy landscape innocent of history. Sinicized names of passing settlements
appear in Mandarin and English on digital message boards in each car. Lhabhagar becomes Bayi, which
means “8-1” in Mandarin. The name recalls the founding of the People’s Liberation Army on August 1,
1927. Tibetans joke that Bayi, once a tiny settlement and now an industrial town swelled by immigration,
means eight Chinese for every Tibetan (Buckley, 2006).
On the train the visible landscape is fleeting:
The P.A. system announced the Tanggula Pass, the highest point of our journey. . . . I
had a mental image of the pass based on visits to other high passes in Tibet: the
snowcapped mountains arrayed imperiously against the blue sky, supervising subsidiary
ranges that stretched in rich layers below them. But I couldn’t tell when we passed
Tanggula. None of the cairns or prayer flags that flame views of Tibetan passes
appeared. The railway seemed to have forgone some of the dramatic vistas offered by
the road. . . .
Once, a herd of antelope skipped beside the tracks. Looking for more of them, I saw
black nomad tents on a distant hillside. Yaks with white stripes on their backs appeared
in the dank yellow grass. The train whizzed past empty stations; on the rare occasion
that we stopped, there were hardly any Tibetans to be seen. This seemed the strangest
aspect of a rail service designed to benefit local people: their meager presence outside
as well as inside the train. (Mishra, 2007, pp. 82–98)
Compare this to a Chinese rail tour company’s account: “From the train windows, an authentic
China slideshow is presented in front of you to look and speculate”(“What to See,” 2006). Periodic
announcements recite the height, speed, weight, and length of the train, and the number and length of
tunnels, tracks, and bridges. Not the landscape or the people, but the train is the star of the show. Still,
13

The romance of direct encounter is recounted in Thubron (2011) and Seth (1987).
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the website rejoices, “You can have a close contact with local people on board. Isn’t it an adventurous
experience?”
Pressure-sealed against the sub-frigid thin air of the plateau, the train shrinks scenic encounters
to the visual far. Inside the cocoon of the train even this engagement is optional. Lilting propaganda
shorts in English and Mandarin trumpet the health of high-altitude construction workers, the
environmental sensitivity of the train, and the “luck and fortune” it brings to Tibet. Travelers observe no
deforestation, grassland degradation, soil erosion, or biodiversity loss. They do not see the militarization
of the plateau concealed in tunnels up and down the tracks (International Campaign for Tibet, 2003, pp.
47–48). They do not see nomads herded into prefab roadside housing, the growing gap between rich and
poor, the environmental assault on the plateau. The train’s neocolonial bearers of modernity remain tidily
segregated from the Tibetans they have come to transform, lest unenclosed encounters complicate a
presumptive narrative of largesse and pristineness.
As a structure of enclosure, the train to Tibet is wildly successful. The ride is seamless—neither
prickly (uncomfortable to occupy) nor obviously jittery (constantly observed), neither stealthy (difficult to
locate) nor slippery (lacking direct approach). Its defining crustiness (as a barrier to the natural
environment) wraps riders in comfort. Train travel, Michel de Certeau (1984) aptly wrote, is a “module of
imprisonment that makes possible the production of an order, a close and autonomous insularity” (p.
111).
Conclusion
Enclosure is a Han strategy for starving a spiritual sphere that once was materialized in Tibetan
public life. Beyond the ethnosites examined here, Han refusal to permit the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet
amounts to an ongoing enclosure of the faithful. As a preemptive strike in the upcoming struggle to name
his successor, the PRC has decreed that all newly reincarnated lamas must be PRC-approved. The
Fourteenth has parried by predicting the appearance of his reincarnation outside Tibet (Bernama, 2010;
Mirsky, 2011; Yardley & Wong, 2011, p. A1). This is a risky tactic. An emanated Chenrezig severed from
the landscape that holds up the cosmic universe threatens to cut the sacred ground from under its
devotees, a peril not diminished by the demolition of the Barkhor or its reconfiguration as a shopping
corridor. The Chinese will offer their own handpicked reincarnation, whose rootedness in Tibetan soil will
be staked against a deterritorialized competitor with no ritually sanctified connection to the land.
In this light I reflect at last on Tibetan self-immolation. Like kora, its mode is embodiment.
Perhaps unexpectedly for so violent a gesture, the Dalai Lama refuses to condemn it, provided it is done in
a loving spirit (Central Tibetan Administration, 2013). Intrinsically and disturbingly speechless in the
event,14 the power of self-immolation lies in its double meaning. On one hand and in the most gruesome
way, it reveals and publicly dramatizes the violence of Han annihilation of Tibetan culture. On the other,
14

The blogger Woeser has posted the last words of 19 Tibetan self-immolators (2012). These were

translated into English and posted on the blog Global Voices (Lam, 2012). Each testimony gives voice to
the injustice of religious and cultural oppression in Tibet.
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acting on their own bodies on their own terms in defiance of the regime, self-immolators transform
violence into unwavering self-sacrifice. Such self-inflicted pain continually unmakes (Scarry, 1985) the
presumptive space the Chinese strive to nail down. Onlookers cannot, figuratively speaking, turn away.
Profound acts of presence in desperate landscapes grant a hearing to human beings with no other rights
to speak. Such gestures reconfigure the visible and sayable, even if the final horizon of their political
effects remains uncertain.
Though the odds against the Tibetans are long, and though unimaginable self-immolation has
been met by unthinkable architectural destruction, it should be remembered that the Chinese have failed
to extirpate Tibetan Buddhism for 60 years, and that Tibetans understand their own history as an
oscillation of decline and revival on a scale of centuries. Overlaying a transcendent order on a political one
through the public practice of kora and now self-immolation, devotees testify to who they are and what
they intend to become in relation to the forces that surround them, secular and divine. Their patient
animation of the numinous against enclosure exposes them to destruction, but also carves out a domain
that temporal power cannot reach. “The Chinese say this is all one country,” a monk from southern
Qinghai told a journalist on the first anniversary of the 2008 riots. “They don’t know what’s in our hearts”
(Wong, 2009, p. A6). The monk tapped his chest. Here is the most protected enclosure of all.
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